To help offer the best experience possible, Guilford uses cookies on its site. By browsing here, you acknowledge our terms of use. For more information, see our Cookie Policy.
You can also read Guilford's Privacy Policy.

×
Skip to main content

Everything you need with Guilford's 30-day ALL ACCESS pass, just $49.95 | Click on any article to purchase  

Search
Search
Quick Search anywhere
Advanced Search
Skip main navigation

Morality as a Regulator of Divergence: Protecting Against Deviance While Promoting Diversity

Published Online:February 2021https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.81

Abstract

Living together cooperatively in groups requires creating and maintaining healthy socio-cultural normative structures (i.e., shared “normed” beliefs, values, practices, and so on) that allow all members of the group to function well, both as individuals and as a part of the communal whole. This requires maintaining a delicate and dynamic balance between protecting members of the group from undue harm, while allowing for individual freedom, choice, and creativity—for example, determining when a new belief, value, or practice is a form of acceptable (even desirable) diversity to be allowed, and when it is a form of deviance to be shut down. I will argue that maintaining this balance is the primary function of morality—and that it requires an understanding of ourselves as moral beings oriented towards “the good” that is stable enough to be shared and passed down to future generations, yet flexible enough to adapt and change as our cumulative experiences expand and alter that understanding.

REFERENCES

  • Annas J. (2011). Intelligent virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  • Beebe J. R. (2014): How different kinds of disagreement impact folk metaethical judgments. In Wright J. C., & Sarkissian H. (Eds): Advances in experimental moral Psychology: Affect, character, and commitments (pp. 167–178). London: Bloomsbury. Google Scholar
  • Beebe J. R. (2015): The empirical study of folk metaethics. Etyka, 15, 11–28. Google Scholar
  • Baril G., , & Wright J.C. (2012). Different types of moral cognition: Moral stages versus moral foundations. Personality and Individual Differences, 53, 468–473. Google Scholar
  • Beebe J. R., , & Sackris D. (2016): Moral objectivism across the lifespan. Philosophical Psychology, 29(6), 919–929. Google Scholar
  • Bicchieri C. (2006). The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. New York: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
  • Blackburn S. (1984). Spreading the word: Groundings in the philosophy of Language. New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  • Brink D. O. (1989). Moral realism and the foundations of ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
  • Calhoun C. (2000). The virtue of civility, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 29(3), 251–275. Google Scholar
  • Curry O. (2016). Morality as cooperation: A problem-centered approach. In Shackelford T. K., & Hansen R. D. (Eds.), The evolution of morality (Evolutionary Psychology series; pp. 27–51). New York: Springer. Google Scholar
  • Davidson P., , Turiel E., , & Black A. (1983). The effect of stimulus familiarity on the use of criteria and justifications in children's social reasoning. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 1, 49–65. Google Scholar
  • Doris J. M. (2002). Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
  • Goodwin G., , & Darley J. (2008). The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism. Cognition, 106, 1339–1366. Google Scholar
  • Goodwin G., , & Darley J. (2010). The perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs: Psychological findings and implications for public policy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 1–28. Google Scholar
  • Goodwin G., , & Darley J. (2012). Why are some moral beliefs perceived to be more objective than others? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 250–256. Google Scholar
  • Graham J., , Nosek B. A., , Haidt J., , Iyer R., , Koleva S., , & Ditto P. H. (2011). Mapping themoral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 366–385. Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Haidt J. (2012). The righteous mind. London: Allen Lane. Google Scholar
  • Haidt J., , & Graham J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research, 20, 98–116. Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Haidt J., , Graham J., , & Joseph C. (2009). Above and below left-right: Ideological narratives and moral foundations. Psychological Inquiry, 20, 110–119. Google Scholar
  • Haidt J., , Rosenberg E., , & Hom H. (2003). Differentiating diversities: Moral diversity is not like other kinds. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33, 36. Google Scholar
  • Harman G. (1999). Moral philosophy meets social psychology: Virtue ethics and the fundamental attribution error. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99, 315–331. Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Killen M., , & Nucci L. (1995). Morality, autonomy, and social conflict. In Killen M., & Hart D. (Eds.), Morality in everyday life: Developmental perspectives (pp. 52–86). New York: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
  • Killen M., , & Smetana J. (Eds.). (2006). Handbook of moral development. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Google Scholar
  • Kohlberg L. (1994). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In Puka B. (Ed.), Defining perspectives in moral development (pp. 1–134). New York, NY: Garland. Google Scholar
  • Lapsley D. (1996). Moral psychology. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Google Scholar
  • Mackie J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. New York: Penguin. Google Scholar
  • Nichols S. (2004). After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judgment. Philosophical Psychology, 17, 5–28. Google Scholar
  • Nichols S., , & Folds-Bennett T. (2003). Are children moral objectivists? Children's judgments about moral and response-dependent properties. Cognition, 90, B23–B32. Google Scholar
  • Nucci L. (1981). Conceptions of personal issues: A domain distinct from moral or societal concepts. Child Development, 52, 114–121. Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Nucci L. (1996). Morality and the personal sphere of actions. In Reed E., , Turiel E., , & Brown T. (Eds.), Values and knowledge (pp. 41–60). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Google Scholar
  • Nucci L., , & Turiel E. (2000). The moral and the personal: Sources of social conflict. In Nucci L., & Saxe G. B. (Eds.), Culture, thought, and development (pp. 115–137). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Google Scholar
  • Pölzler T., , & Wright J. C., (2020). Anti-realist pluralism: A new approach to folk meta-ethics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 11 53–82. Google Scholar
  • Pölzler T., , & Wright J. C. (2019). Empirical research on folk moral objectivism, Philosophy Compass, 14(5), e12589. Google Scholar
  • Rachels J., , & Rachels S. (2009). The elements of moral philosophy. New York: McGraw Hill. Google Scholar
  • Sarkissian H., Parks J., , Tien D., , Wright J. C., , & Knobe J. (2011) Folk moral relativism. Mind & Language, 26(4), 482–505. Reprinted in J. Knobe & S. Nichols (Eds,) (2013), Experimental philosophy, vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  • Skitka L. J., , Bauman C. W., , & Sargis E. G. (2005). Moral conviction: Another contributor to attitude strength or something more? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 895–917. Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Skitka L. J., , & Mullen E. (2002). The dark side of moral conviction. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 7, 35–41. Google Scholar
  • Smetana J. G. (1981). Preschool children's conceptions of moral and social rules. Child Development, 52, 1333–1336. Google Scholar
  • Smetana J. G. (1983). Social-cognitive development: Domain distinctions and coordinations. Developmental Review, 3, 131–147. Google Scholar
  • Smetana J. G., , & Braeges J. (1990). The development of toddlers' moral and conventional judgments. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 36, 329–346. Google Scholar
  • Smith M. (1994). The moral problem. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Google Scholar
  • Snare F. (1992). The nature of moral thinking. London: Routledge. Google Scholar
  • Stoddart T., , & Turiel E. (1985). Children's concepts of cross-gender activities. Child Development, 56, 1241–1253. Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Strohminger N., , & Nichols S. (2014). The essential moral self. Cognition, 131, 159–171. Crossref, Google Scholar
  • Sunstein C. (2019) How change happens. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Google Scholar
  • Theriault J., , Waytz A., , Heiphetz L., , & Young L. (2017). Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146(11), 1586–1605. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000350 Google Scholar
  • Tisak MS (1995): Domains of social reasoning and beyond. In Vasta R (ed): “Annals of Child Development. Vol. II.” London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, pp 95–130. Google Scholar
  • Turiel E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: Morality and conventions. New York: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
  • Turiel E. (1998). The development of morality. In Eisenberg N. (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3. Social, emotional, and personality development (5th ed., pp. 701–778). New York: Wiley. Google Scholar
  • Velleman D. (2013). Foundations of moral relativism. Cambridge, UK: Open Book. Google Scholar
  • Wainryb C., , Shaw L., , Langley M., , Cottam K., , & Lewis R. (2004). Children's thinking about diversity of belief in the early school years: Judgments of relativism, tolerance, and disagreeing persons. Child Development, 75(3), 687–703. Google Scholar
  • Wainryb C., , Shaw L. A., , Laupa M., , & Smith K. R. (2001). Children's, adolescents,‘ and young adults’ thinking about different types of disagreements. Developmental Psychology, 37, 373–386. Google Scholar
  • Wainryb C., , Shaw L. A., , & Maianu C. (1998). Tolerance and intolerance: Children's and adolescents' judgments of dissenting beliefs, speech, persons, and conduct. Child Development, 69(6), 1541–1555. Google Scholar
  • Wong D. B. (2006). Natural moralities: A defense of pluralistic relativism. New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C. (2008). The role of moral perception in mature moral agency. In Winewski J. (Ed.), Moral perception (pp. 1–24). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C. (2012). Children's and adolescents' tolerance for divergent beliefs: Exploring the cognitive and affective dimensions of moral conviction in our youth. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30(4), 493–510. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C. (2015). Meta-ethical pluralism: A cautionary tale about cohesive moral communities [commentary]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x14001344 Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C. (2018a). The fact and function of meta-ethical pluralism: Examining the evidence. Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, vol. 2 (Eds. Lombrozo T., , Nichols S., , & Knobe J.). New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C. (2018b). Moral knowledge as know-how. In Zimmerman A., , Jones K., , & Timmons M. (Eds.), Routledge handbook of moral epistemology (pp, 427–439). New York: Routledge; Taylor & Francis. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C. (2019). Humility: A foundational virtue. Humility: Reflections on its nature and function (Oxford series). New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C., , Cullum J., , & Schwab N. (2008). The cognitive and affective dimensions of moral conviction: Implications for attitudinal and behavioral measures of interpersonal tolerance. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(11), 1461–1476. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C., , Grandjean P., , & McWhite C. (2013). The meta-ethical grounding of our moral beliefs: Evidence for meta-ethical pluralism. Philosophical Psychology, 26(3), 336–361. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C., McWhite C., , & Grandjean P. (2014). The cognitive mechanisms of intolerance: Do our meta-ethical commitments matter? Oxford studies in experimental philosophy, vol. 1 (Eds. Lombrozo T., , Nichols S., , & Knobe J.). New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C., , & Pölzler T. (2019). Should morality be abolished? An empirical challenge to the argument from intolerance. Manuscript under review. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C., , & Sarkissian H. (2012). Folk meta-ethical commitments. In Allhof F., , Mallon R., , & Nichols S. (Eds), Philosophy: Traditional and experimental readings (pp. 531–536). New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
  • Wright J. C., , Warren M., , & Snow N. (2020) Understanding virtue: Theory and measurement. New York: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar
Previous article
Next article